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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 A defendant is on trial for first-degree murder.1 The state alleges that he shot a man in 
cold blood during a mass fight near a convenience store.2 Three people discharged guns during 
the struggle,3 but no one saw who fired the fatal shot.4 Video evidence shows two men holding 
guns at the scene, but the defendant is not one of them.5 The defendant concedes that he was at 
the convenience store during the shooting and that he was carrying a gun.6 He explains, however, 
that he shot his gun into the air for the sake of scaring people off, thereby acting in self-defense.7 
 During trial, the prosecutor presents the testimony of a police officer who is qualified as 
an expert in gang culture.8 The testimony is offered to prove that the killing was premeditated.9 
The prosecution ultimately wants to show that the defendant is a member of a gang that has a 
violent rivalry with the victim’s gang; that the defendant shot the man in retaliation for the 
victim’s crossing onto the defendant’s turf.10 The officer discusses details about general gang 
culture and also specific information about the defendant’s group.11 He identifies former 
confrontations between the two gangs involved, how the defendant’s gang uses gun violence to 
gain respect, and that the defendant is a “hardcore,” generational member of his group.12 The 
jury returns a guilty verdict and the defendant is sentenced to life in prison without the possibility 
of parole.13  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See People v. Bynum, No. 307028, 2013 WL 1689660, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013), perm. app. granted,  
2 Id. at 1. 
3 Id. at 3. 
4 Id. at 1-2. 
5 Id. at 2.  
6 Id.  
7 Id.  
8 Id. at 6.  
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 7-8.  
11 Id. at 7. 
12 Id. 	  
13 Id. at 3.   
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 This testimony was proffered in People v. Bynum, a case pending on appeal in the 
Michigan Supreme Court.14 Bynum illustrates the serious consequences that a criminal defendant 
faces when broad, highly prejudicial expert testimony is admitted at trial. If evidence is not 
properly monitored, the jury may render a verdict based on otherwise impermissible information. 
Indeed, a defendant is entitled to a fair and impartial jury under the Sixth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution.15 But, beyond the rights of the accused, when a court abuses its 
discretion and admits improper expert testimony, the judicial system’s integrity is compromised.  
 The court’s admission of such testimony typically stems from the pretrial process, when a 
court serves as “gatekeeper” and determines whether the evidence is admissible.16 With regards 
to the admissibility of gang expert testimony, the Supreme Court has not considered the issue,17 
leaving lower federal and state courts responsible for determining the admissibility of such 
evidence. Understandably, courts are inconsistent on the extent to which gang expert testimony 
may be permitted.18 Beyond general admissibility of gang experts, there is an ongoing struggle 
with respect to the function and scope of the testimony and how it affects a jury.19 The court is 
responsible for ensuring that irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial evidence stays out of the 
courtroom to keep the jury from reaching a verdict based on impermissible purposes.20  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 838 N.W.2d at 884. 
15 SEE U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI.  
16 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
17 But see Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159 (1992) (the use of gang involvement in sentencing is 
unconstitutional because the reference “was without relevance to the sentencing proceeding”). 	  
18 Some courts have a general presumption of admissibility if certain factors are met and other courts 
merely use the 403-balancing test to determine admissibility. Compare People v. Gardely, 927 P.2d 713 
(Cali. 1996) (gang expert testimony admissible if related to culture, habits, or psychology of a gang) with 
United States v. Street, 548 F.3d 618 (8th Cir. 2008) (gang expert testimony rejected as irrelevant where 
gang ties to defendant are minimal).  
19 Cf. Placido G. Gomez, It is Not so Simply Because an Expert Says it is so: The Reliability of Gang 
Expert Testimony Regarding Membership in Criminal Street Gangs: Pushing the Limits of Rule 702, 34 
ST. MARY'S L. J. 581, 600-605 (2003) (criticizing the Texas courts’ analyses of gang experts’ reliability).  
20 See e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 401-403 (1973); see also Gen. Elect. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).  
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 Typically, two tough issues arise when the prosecution offers a gang expert at trial. First 
is the question of whether gang opinion testimony is reliable21 and also whether its prejudicial 
nature outweighs its probative value.22 Regarding the former, the court must determine whether 
the testimony is the product of reliable methodology or sources.23 Gang experts are typically law 
enforcement officers “who ha[ve] significant law enforcement training focusing on gangs and 
gang-related crime.” 24 Although experienced-based experts are allowed to shed light on a fact or 
issue not generally known to the average person, the opinions offered by officers are typically 
suspect and “do not lend themselves to systematic scrutiny based on objective retesting, and the 
data cannot be [easily] validated.”25  
 For the latter issue, the word “gang” has a strong stigma attached to it. “[G]angs are 
particularly susceptible to labeling as deviant, regardless of their behavior.”26 Thus, even the 
mention of a defendant’s gang affiliation likely straddles the line of impermissible character 
evidence either by triggering general bias against gang members or the common assumption of 
“guilt by association.”27 Pair the mention of gang activity with the support of expert testimony 
and the risk of prejudice is substantially heightened. Generally, when such testimony is 
introduced, juries are instructed to disregard such biases.28 However, instructions may not be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 See Placido G. Gomez, It is Not so Simply Because an Expert Says it is so: The Reliability of Gang 
Expert Testimony Regarding Membership in Criminal Street Gangs: Pushing the Limits of Rule 702. ST. 
MARY'S L. J., 581, 589-90 (2003) (citations omitted). 
22 Susan L. Burrell, Gang Evidence: Issues for Criminal Defense, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 739 (1990). 
23 See FED. R. EVID. 702 (1973); see also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588.  
24 See supra note 21.  
25 Id.(emphasis added); see also Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Next Step After Daubert, Developing a 
Similarly Epistemological Approach to Ensuring the Reliability of Nonscientific Expert Testimony, 15 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2271, 2279 (1994).  
26 Joan W. Moore, Isolation and Stigmatization in the Development of an Underclass: The Case of 
Chicano Gangs in East Los Angeles, 33 SOC. PROBS. 1, 2 (1985).   
27 David Cole, Hanging with the Wrong Crowd: of Gangs, Terrorists, and the Right of Association, 1999 
SUP. CT. REV. 203, 224 (1999).  
28 See Id.; see also United States v. Modanlo, No. 8:10-cr-00295-PJM, 2013 WL 6689117, at * 1 (2013) 
(jury instructions attached).  	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enough to keep the jury’s improper inferences away when a party introduces such highly 
prejudicial evidence.  
 This paper asserts that courts must do more to monitor the admissibility and scope of 
gang expert testimony. A criminal defendant’s constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial is 
on the line and, in gang cases, an expert’s opinions pose the risk of being unreliable and too 
prejudicial. Courts should stick to the traditional expert analysis and also adopt a number of 
additional protective measures to make up for the extreme nature of these particular opinions.  
 Part II outlines the general framework in which courts admit or exclude expert testimony 
with an emphasis on the Federal Rules of Evidence (“FRE”). The section next demonstrates why 
gang expert testimony is problematic and how courts need to pay particular attention to the 
reliability and risk-of-unfair-prejudice analyses. Part III focuses on California’s gang expert 
jurisprudence to demonstrate how not to analyze the admissibility of such testimony.  
 Part IV suggests that gang expert testimony is more appropriate in cases where gang 
affiliation is an essential element of the crime, but explains how, although more probative to a 
case, that testimony should still only be admitted in narrow circumstances. When gang affiliation 
is not an essential element of the crime, Part V proposes that courts should consider the 
admissibility of gang expert witnesses similar to the way courts consider the admissibility of 
conspiracy testimony. Specifically, other gang evidence should be presented to corroborate the 
gang expert’s statements.  
 Part VI argues for a presumption that general gang testimony is inadmissible because the 
prejudicial nature of such testimony always outweighs its probative value. Also, in a case where 
expert testimony is admitted, courts should take steps to substantially limit the scope of what the 
expert can and cannot discuss. Part VI also suggests that a jury instruction should always be 
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included as a final safeguard before the jury deliberates. To conclude, Part VII applies this 
paper’s recommendations to the Bynum case illustrated above and a California case, People v. 
Killebrew, to demonstrate how such protections would limit, yet allow, gang expert testimony.  
II. QUALIFYING AN EXPERT AT TRIAL AND CAREFUL CONSIDERATIONS FOR A GANG EXPERT 
 
 Expert testimony is quite effective, especially if not met with contradicting testimony by 
the opposing side.29 In fact, “experts are used more frequently, particularly by the prosecution” 
because the evidence is quite persuasive to juries.30 Consequently, courts are being introduced to 
“increasingly innovative use[s] of expert testimony in criminal cases,” like gang expert 
testimony.31 Regardless of the type of expert testimony, courts are required to consider a number 
of factors before the expert may testify. 
A. The Traditional Expert Analysis 
 A trial court serves as a “gatekeeper” of expert testimony.32 Each court addresses whether 
a witness qualifies as an expert through what is supposed to be a very fact-specific inquiry.33 
Most courts have adopted all or part of the Federal Rules of Evidence (“FRE”). For purposes of 
this paper, those rules will be emphasized to demonstrate the conventional expert analysis.  
 As Judge Harvey Brown explained, a party must open a series of “gates” to qualify a 
witness as an expert.34 Those gates include helpfulness, qualifications, relevancy, reliability, and 
finally, the risk of prejudice.35 Gang expert testimony also triggers the rule against character 
evidence under FRE 404.36 Therefore, courts must ask whether the purpose of the testimony is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 See generally Paul S. Meyer, Expert Testimony in Criminal Trials, LITIGATION, Winter 1982, at 23-27. 
30 Id. at 27. 	  
31 Id. at 23.  
32 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597.   
33 Id. at 579-80. 
34 Judge Harvey Brown, Eight Gates for Expert Witnesses, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 743, 758 (1999). 
35 Id.  
36 See FED. R. EVID. 404 (1973).  
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offered to show that the defendant acted in accordance with a particular propensity on a 
particular occasion.37  
 When a party offers expert testimony, a court will first consider the helpfulness of the 
testimony, which reflects FRE 702.38 The rule states that a witness may testify as an expert if his 
“knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or . . . determine a fact in 
issue.”39 As such, the expert’s knowledge of a subject must impress ‘“upon an experience 
confessedly foreign in kind to [the jury's] own.”’40 For most jurisdictions, “[an] expert may aid 
the jury in understanding even familiar matters if the expert's experience or training provides a 
more . . . refined understanding than ordinary experience provides.”41 However, other courts 
strictly follow the traditional rule that the “subject matter must be beyond the common 
knowledge of the average layman.”42  
 Second, the expert must be qualified to talk about or proffer an opinion on a particular 
subject.43 For example, FRE 702 allows “expert testimony in scientific, technical, or other 
specialized areas” so long as the witness has the requisite “knowledge, skill, experience, training, 
or education.”44 “The level of [expertise] a person must possess to be considered an expert on a 
particular topic is difficult to quantify by ‘definite guidelines.”’45 In applying the rule, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recognized that, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 See Id.  
38 See FED. R. EVID. 702 (1973).	  
39 Id.  
40 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999) (quoting Judge Learned Hand, Historical and 
Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 54 (1901).	  
41 See supra note 34 at p. 751.  
42 See Michael H. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence § 702.4, at n.4 (4th ed. 1996) (recognizing that 
some courts still use the common language that the “subject matter must be beyond the common 
knowledge of the average layman” when addressing Rule 702); see also People v Kowalski, 821 N.W.2d 
14 (Mich. 2012) (“Where the proffered testimony is not relevant or not helpful because it does not involve 
matters beyond the common understanding of jurors, it is inadmissible”).  
43 See supra note 34.  
44 FED. R. EVID. 702. 
45 See supra note 34 p. 758. 
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[w]hile extensive academic and practical expertise in an area is certainly 
sufficient to qualify a potential witness as an expert, Rule 702 specifically 
contemplates the admission of testimony by experts whose knowledge is based on 
experience . . . a court should consider a proposed expert's full range of practical 
experience as well as academic or technical training when determining whether 
that expert is qualified to render an opinion in a given area.46 
 
Gang experts fall into the latter category and generally qualify as experts based on their 
membership experiences with gangs or extensive training as law enforcement officers.47  
 Courts are next required to assess whether the expert testimony is relevant to the case.48 
This means that the expert’s testimony must “tend to prove or disprove some fact at issue in the 
proceeding.”49 The relevancy threshold is generally low,50 which is apparent in the use of the 
word “tend” in FRE 401, but courts are in no position to blast past this analysis.51 In fact, higher 
courts have overturned jury verdicts in cases where gang experts have offered irrelevant 
testimony.52 
  In United States v. Street,53 the state tried to prove motive by showing that the defendant 
adopted a gang’s policy against “snitches.”54 A detective testified about an outlaw motorcycle 
gang and its extensive criminal history.55 However, it was undisputed that the defendant was not 
a part of that gang, but merely had associations with gang members.56 The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the testimony was largely irrelevant because the expert’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 United States v. Parra, 402 F.3d 752, 758 (7th Cir. 2005).  
47 See supra note 21.  
48 See e.g., FED. R. EVID. 402 (1973); see also supra note 34; Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587.	  	  
49 See e.g., FED. R. EVID. 401 (1973). 
50 See Tenard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 285 (2004) (explaining that the relevance analysis is a “low 
threshold”).  
51 See supra note 49.  
52 See e.g., United States v. Street, 548 F.3d 618 (8th Cir. 2008); see also State v. DeShay, 669 N.W.2d 
878 (Minn. 2003).  
53 548 F.3d at 618.  
54 Id. at 631.  
55 Id.  
56 Id. at 631-32.  
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discussion about the gang’s violent past had nothing to do with its “no snitch” policy.57  Also, the 
defendant’s nominal ties with the gang did not tend to prove motive, since other witnesses 
testified that his associations with the gang were minimal at best.58 As Street demonstrates, the 
expert’s testimony must at least aid in determining some contested issue. 
 Assuming that the testimony is relevant, the judge then considers whether it is reliable.59 
In the landmark case Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the United States Supreme 
Court first addressed the reliability requirement for experts.60 The Court laid out four non-
exclusive factors that trial courts may consider when evaluating reliability, including:  
whether the theory or technique in question can be (and has been) tested, whether 
it has been subjected to peer review and publication, its known or potential error 
rate, and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling its operation, and 
whether it has attracted widespread acceptance within a relevant scientific 
community.61 
 
Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael later extended the Daubert analysis to encompass any expert 
testimony rather than just scientific expert testimony.62 The Court further recognized that the 
determination of reliability is a “flexible” one and that Daubert’s factors “do not all necessarily 
apply even in every instance in which the reliability of . . . testimony is challenged.”63 Hence, the 
reliability standard is highly discretionary.64  
 The final step of the analysis is the trial court’s determination of what is traditionally 
known as the “403-balancing test.”65 The court must analyze whether the danger of unfair 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Id. at 632. 
58 Id. at 633 (“we conclude that Cook's testimony about outlaw motorcycle gangs and El Forasteros was 
excessive, unduly prejudicial, and in great part completely irrelevant to the charged offenses”). 
59 See supra note 34; see also FED. R. EVID. 702; Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591.  
60 509 U.S. at 591.	  	  
61 Id. at 592-93.  
62 526 U.S. at 147-48.  
63 Id. at 141.  
64 Cf. Id.  
65 See e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403 (1973).  
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prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value.66 “Expert evidence can be both powerful 
and quite misleading because of the difficulty in evaluating it. Because of this risk, the judge in 
weighing possible prejudice against probative force . . . exercises more control over experts than 
over lay witnesses.’’67 Also, when a jury evaluates whom to believe, “an expert will often 
represent the only seemingly objective source, offering it a much sought-after hook on which to 
hang its hat.”68 This sentiment is especially true in cases where an expert offers testimony on a 
subject that has a strong stigma of criminality and so this analysis is extremely important in cases 
where a gang expert is offered.69   
 While considering whether the prejudicial nature substantially outweighs it probative 
value, the court, in effect, must consider FRE 404.70 Such testimony may be held impermissible 
because it triggers the rule against character evidence.71 Typically, the evidence is offered to 
boost the probability that the defendant committed the criminal act charged. 72  Although 
probative, evidence of a defendant's character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 See e.g., Id.; see also Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988) (the trial court should assess 
such evidence under the usual rules for admissibility: “[t]he determination must be made whether the 
danger of undue prejudice outweighs the probative value of the evidence . . . appropriate for making 
decisions of this kind under Rule 403”). 
67 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 (quoting Jack B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence Is 
Sound; It Should Not Be Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631, 632 (1991)). 
68 Judge David Hoort, “Expert Testimony—Gangs and Otherwise,” BlogSpot (March 21, 2014 12:12 
PM), http://judgedavidhoort.blogspot.com/2013_04_01_archive.html. 	  
69 See Barry F. McNeil and Bill Morrison, The expert testimony must not be confusing or prejudicial 
under Rule 403, 4 BUS. & COM. LITIG. FED. CTS. 40, 42 (3d ed.) (citing Weinstein, Rule 702 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence is Sound; It Should Not Be Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631, 632 (1991)); see also 
Casey v. Geek Squad, 823 F. Supp. 2d 334, 347-48 (2011) (noting that “expert testimony has the potential 
to be both powerful and quite misleading, particularly as to technical and scientific matters”). 
70 FED. R. EVID. 404 (1973).  
71 See e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1); see also Lee E. Teitelbaum, Gale Sutton-Barbere & Peder Johnson, 
Evaluating The Prejudicial Effect of Evidence: Can Judges Identify the Impact of Improper Evidence on 
Juries?, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 1147, 1150 (1983) (stating that the balancing test is what courts use to protect 
the jury from hearing bad character evidence). 
72 For a detailed explanation on character evidence and its history along with an argument against 
stringent rules on improper character evidence, see Chris William Sanchirico, Evidence and the Object of 
Trial, 101 COL. L. REV. 1227, 1233 (2001).  
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the defendant acted in accordance with that character on a particular occasion.73 This evidence 
will only be considered if it fits into a jurisdiction’s recognized exception or is offered for some 
“non-propensity reason,” such as motive or identity.74  
 The reasons for excluding such evidence are “that there is a danger that a jury will 
convict a defendant to penalize him or her for . . . past deeds or simply because he or she is an 
undesirable person.”75 Also, “there is a possibility that the jury will overvalue the character 
evidence in assessing guilt for the crime charged” and “it is unfair to require a defendant to be 
prepared not only to defend against immediate charges, but also to disprove or explain his or her 
personality or prior actions.”76  
 In assessing whether testimony is impermissible character evidence, courts are required 
to determine the purpose of the party’s offer.77 There is a difference between testimony that is 
actually offered for a non-propensity purpose and evidence that is offered under the guise of a 
non-propensity purpose. For example, where the identity of a gang member is at issue, expert 
testimony that explains a gang’s requirement that all members get a specific tattoo on a particular 
part of the body is acceptable to prove that the defendant is a member based on the existence and 
placement of that tattoo.78  
 However, many cases arise where the purpose of the testimony is not crystal clear or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 See Id.  
74 See Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 404(a), (b)(2). The majority of states have similar rules to the Federal 
rules.  
75 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1105 (2014) (citing Masters v. People, 58 P.3d 979 (Colo. 2002); Ridgeway 
v. State, 779 A.2d 1031 (Md. App. 2001), judgment aff'd, 797 A.2d 1287 (2002); State v. Gowan, 13 P.3d 
376 (Mont. 2000)). 
76 See Id.  
77 See e.g., United States v. King, 230 F.3d 1361, 1366 (6th Cir. 2000); for a broad explanation on a trial 
courts’ duties see 88 C.J.S. Trial § 184 (2014) (citing Security Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Owen, 501 S.W.2d 
229 (1973); Van Ornum v. Otter Tail Power Co., 210 N.W.2d 188 (N.D. 1973); McGrath v. Rohde, 289 
N.E.2d 619 (1972)).  
78 See e.g., State v. Torrez, 874 A.2d 1084, 1089 (N.J. 2005).  
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minimally relates to the purpose for which it is being offered.79 For example, a prosecutor might 
offer gang expert testimony to prove a non-propensity reason such as motive, yet the testimony 
nominally ties the defendant to the purpose, while at the same time discusses the gang’s violent 
activities.80 This was the case in United States v. Garcia.81 The prosecution introduced a gang 
expert to support the state’s theory of motive; that since the defendant was a member of a gang, 
he was more likely to agree and aid in the commission of a murder.82 The court expressed that 
“the theory that the defendant aided and abetted a murder by ‘fanning the fires of gang warfare’” 
would be a smack of “guilt by association.”83 Thus, courts must go beyond the offering party’s 
asserted purpose, and scrutinize whether the testimony actually tends to prove that purpose.  
B. Why Gang Expert Testimony is Problematic 
 
 Gang expert testimony is challenging because it is unreliable, highly prejudicial, and 
triggers the rule against character evidence. There are issues with the reliability of gang expert 
testimony because both the experts and their sources are considered suspect.84 However, “[m]any 
jurors believe that police officers possess an ‘“aura of special reliability and trustworthiness.”’85 
The reliability vs. credibility dichotomy poses a problem because jurors are more inclined to rely 
on unverifiable testimony in gang cases, especially if the information rendered is proffered a 
police officer.  
 Second, any mention of gang affiliation is highly inflammatory to the jury. The stigma is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 See e.g., State v. Thomes, 697 A.2d 1262, 1265 (Me. 1997) (district court allowed introduction of 
sexually explicit statements to show his motive to seduce two minor girls); see also Cotney v. State, 26 
So. 2d 603 (Ala. 1945) (offer of evidence showing dying declaration not crystal clear).  
80 See e.g., United States v. Garcia, 151 F.3d 1243 (9th Cir. 1998).  
81 Id.  
82 Id. at 1244.  
83 Id. at 1245 (citing Mitchell v. Prunty, 107 F.3d 1337, 1342 (9th Cir.1997)).	  
84 See supra note 21 (noting that the general reliability analysis for gang experts is defective). 
85 Patrick Mark Mahoney, Note, Houses Built on Sand: Police Expert Testimony in California Gang 
Prosecutions: Did Gardeley Go Too Far?, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 385 (2004).  
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so strong that even in areas where more jurors tend to distrust law enforcement and the criminal 
justice system, “these same people . . . have to live with gang violence within their families and 
neighborhoods. [T]he group of jurors who used to be the most favorable to a defendant all of a 
sudden becomes the least favorable.”86 This leads to the last issue, that a party’s offering of gang 
expert testimony always triggers the character evidence rule.87 Gangs are so attached to the 
stigma of criminality that many jurors wish to punish the defendant for his affiliations or believe 
that the defendant is guilty because he is associated with a group that may be involved in illegal 
activity. 
1. Why gang experts may be unreliable 
 Gang experts are considered suspect because of their status and also because of the 
information that they rely on to render their opinions. Gang experts are generally law 
enforcement officials with significant training in gang-related activity.88 Although experience in 
an area is enough to become an expert at trial,89 the testimony rendered must be based on reliable 
sources.90 The problem begins with the suspicious nature of the sources and also the drawback 
that the information is not easily verifiable.  
 Most gang experts generally rely on a number of factors specifically developed to 
identify a gang or its members.91 One issue with these considerations is that they are either too 
department-specific or too broad to encompass the uniqueness of each gang.92 The problem with 
department-specific factors is that they are not generally accepted or recognized by the law 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Erin R. Yoshino, California’s Criminal Gang Enhancements: Lessons From Interviews with 
Practitioners, 18 USC Rev. of L. & Soc. Just. 107, 135 (2008).  
87 FED. R. EVID. 404; see also Gutierrez v. State, 32 A.3d 2, 11 (2011).  
88 See supra note 21.  
89 See e.g. Fed R. Evid. 702; see also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579.  
90 Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 142. 
91 See supra note 21 at p. 605; see also supra note 86 at p. 113 (for a list of factors that officers may rely 
on).  
92 Cf. supra note 21 at p. 606.  
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enforcement community and thus do not fall with Daubert’s general acceptance factor.93 On the 
other hand, if a set of criteria is used by agencies on a national level, questions are raised as to 
how those factors can be applied to specific groups in widespread areas that likely have very 
different characteristics.94 Not all gangs are violent and not all gangs push drugs.95 
 The basis for the criteria may be inaccurate as well. 96  Many of the factors that 
departments rely on to identify a gang or its members are constructed through what may be 
considered questionable sources–such as former gang members or police officers.97 The problem 
with former gang members is that they tend to over-exaggerate their experiences with the gang 
or skew facts.98 There is no method to decipher whether the former member is actually giving 
trustworthy information or if he or she is trying to lead officials astray about a specific group. 
This has been the case in circumstances where a gang member in custody gives information in 
exchange for a lower charge or immunity.99 In fact, it has been argued, “[t]here is nothing 
inherently reliable about interviews with suspected gang members that have been arrested.”100   
 Also, police officers’ information may be considered highly suspect since many 
departments respond to pressure from the legislature or the media, which are inclined to over-
sensationalize gang activity and demand justice when brutal crimes are allegedly committed by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 See Daubert, 901 U.S. at 595.  
94 See Gomez, 34 St. Mary’s L. J. at 609 (citing Cheryl Renee Rosier, Former Gang Member’s 
Experiences of Getting in and Getting out of a Gang: A Phenomenological Study at 118 (1998) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, St. Mary’s University) (on file)).  
95 See Jeffrey J. Mayer, Individual Moral Responsibility and the Criminalization of Youth Gangs, 28 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 943, 979 (1993).  
96 Susan L. Burrell, Gang Evidence: Issues for Criminal Defense, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 739, 771 
(1990); see also supra note 21.  
97 See Id.	  	  	  
98 See Id. at 747 (“gang members lie to police with great regularity”).  
99 Id.  
100 See supra note 85 at p. 409. 
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gangs.101 Furthermore, officers who testify are in a position where detecting and minimizing 
gang activity is their duty, adding to the suspect nature of the testimony.102 In fact, when a police 
officer in California was asked how he determined whether an individual was affiliated with a 
gang he said, ‘“if it looks like a duck, quacks like a duck, and swims like a duck, it must be a 
duck.”’103 He further described his method as ‘“basically guilt by association,”’ and “identifying 
individual gang members by their appearance.”104  
 Many states also have “gang banks.”105 These banks are typically computer programs that 
keep track of individuals identified as actual gang members or possible gang members.106 One 
officer explained that law enforcement officials add people to gang banks because they are seen 
hanging out with other potential gang members.107 In fact, in one circumstance, someone was 
entered into a gang bank because he had a basketball hoop in front of his parent’s house.108 Kids 
affiliated with local gangs would play basketball in his driveway. 109  No other evidence 
corroborated the individual’s relationship to the gangs, but the name was entered into the bank 
anyway.110 Also, the information may not be entered correctly; “information entered into official 
gang files may sound unimpeachable, yet mistakes are often made.”111  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 See Scott Decker & Kimberly Kempf –Leonard, Constructing Gangs: The Social Definition of Youth 
Activities, in The Modern Gang Reader 14, 20 (Malcolm W. Klein Eds. 1995); see also Robert J Bursik, 
Jr. & Harold G. Grasmick, Defining Gangs and Gang Behavior, in The Modern Gang Reader 8, 9 
(Malcolm W. Klein Eds. 1995); see also supra note 96 at 747 (indicating that statistics may be altered to 
meet law enforcement needs).  
102 See Id.	  	  
103 See supra note 86 at p. 108. 
104 See Id.  
105 See K. Babe Howell, Fear Itself: The Impact of Allegations of Gang Affiliation on Pre-Trial Detention, 
23 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 620, 653 (2011).  
106 See Id.  
107 See supra note 86 at p. 105.  
108 See supra note 86 at p. 103.  
109 Id.  
110 Id.  
111 See supra note 85 at p. 408.  
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2. Gang expert testimony is highly prejudicial and triggers the character evidence rule   
 For gang cases, the risk of undue prejudice is particularly high because gangs are 
attached to the stereotype of being affiliated with criminality.112 Individuals who are associated 
with gangs are “defined as criminals rather than as [merely] social bandits . . . [i]n city after city, 
the . . . gang is . . . clearly defined as a social problem.”113 Furthermore, the media typically 
sensationalizes gang activity through programs like Sons of Anarchy and Boyz n the Hood.114 
These shows depict gang members as vengeful and violent and also display frequent drug 
activity and murder as if they are normal, day-to-day gang activities.115  
 Jurors are more likely to suspect that since the defendant is engaged in a culture 
purportedly involved with illegal activities, that the defendant likely engaged in the crime at 
issue. Once again, this inference is unacceptable under rule 404, yet undeniably unavoidable 
where a gang relationship is asserted.  
III. PROBLEMS WITH GANG EXPERT TESTIMONY ARE NOT BEING ADDRESSED: A FOCUS ON 
CALIFORNIA JURISPRUDENCE 
 
 California has over six hundred identified gangs, which is the most out of all fifty 
states.116 California’s courts, in effect, are confronted with a high volume of gang-related 
criminal cases.117 The excessive number of gang-related crimes resulted in the legislature 
enacting the California Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act (“STEP Act”) in 2008 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 Susan L. Burrell, Gang Evidence: Issues for Criminal Defense, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 739 (1990). 
113 Joan W. Moore, Isolation and Stigmatization in the Development of an Underclass: The Case of 
Chicano Gangs in East Los Angeles, 33 SOC. PROBS. 1, 2 (1985).   
114 See supra note 112 at p. 771.  
115 Cf. Id.  
116 See FBI, National Gang Threat Assessment–Emerging Trends, NATIONAL GANG INTELLIGENCE 
CENTER 12  (2011), http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/2011-national-gang-threat-
assessment/2011-national-gang-threat-assessment-emerging-trends.  
117 See Id.	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to fight gang activity within the state.118 The STEP Act enhances sentences in gang-related 
cases.119 The legislature explained that California is “in a state of crisis which has been caused 
by violent street gangs whose members threaten, terrorize, and commit a multitude of crimes 
against the peaceful citizens of their neighborhoods.”120 The proposed purpose is to “secure and 
protect[ ]” the citizens of the state “from fear, intimidation, and physical harm caused by the 
activities of violent groups and individuals.”121 
 Before the sentence is increased, the state must prove to a jury that the defendant is 
involved in a “criminal street gang.” Typically, the enhancement will increase the sentence time 
beyond that of the crime’s statutory maximum. Thus, the prosecution must prove that the 
defendant is a part of a gang beyond a reasonable doubt under the United States Supreme Court’s 
Apprendi decision.122 This makes the use of a gang expert much more probative in California 
cases where gang affiliation is asserted. However, just because evidence is more probative does 
not mean it is automatically admitted. The court must also balance the risk of prejudice. 
However, although the STEP Act did not create new evidentiary rules, it “became a vehicle to 
introduce a broad range of evidence that would otherwise be excluded.” 123 
A. The Admissibility of Gang Experts Under California Law 
 Generally, in California, “[t]he requirements for expert testimony are that it relate to a 
subject sufficiently beyond common experience as to assist the trier of fact and be based on a 
matter that is reasonably relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion on the subject to which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.2 (West 2008).   
119 See Id.  
120 See People v. Rodriguez, 290 P.3d 1143 (2012).  
121 Id.  
122 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (holding that enhancing criminal sentences beyond 
statutory maxima must be decided by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt). 
123 Gregory A. Dohi and Darrell Mavis, Getting a Good Grasp on Gang Cases (April 16, 2014) available 
at https://www.dailyjournal.com/cle.cfm?show=CLEDisplayArticle&qVersionID=338&eid=913976& 
evid=1&qtypeid=8 
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his or her testimony relates.”124 The basic requirement does not deviate from traditional expert 
analyses, however, the STEP Act made the initial inquiry superfluous in gang cases. 
 Under the statute, a “criminal street gang is defined as any organization, association or 
group of three or more persons . . . which (1) has continuity of purpose, (2) seeks a group 
identity, and (3) has members who individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a 
pattern of criminal activity.”125 The pattern of criminal activity element requires the state to show 
that a gang’s primary activities include the actual commission of one or more enumerated (out of 
a list of thirty-three) criminal acts.126  
 In People v. Gardeley, the California Supreme Court held that the state need not prove 
that the defendant committed the criminal acts, but may prove that the defendant’s alleged gang 
committed those acts.127 Furthermore, the Supreme Court stated that "[i]n general, where a gang 
enhancement is alleged, expert testimony concerning the culture, habits, and psychology of 
gangs is permissible because these subjects are 'sufficiently beyond common experience that the 
opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact.'"128  
 California’s Supreme Court essentially broadened the admissibility of gang expert 
testimony without regard to traditional evidence rules.129 In essence, the state initiated a 
presumption that evidence tending to show gang culture, habits or psychology is generally 
permissible.130 The problem with the legislature’s and the court’s evidential expansion may be 
reflected in the relative number of prisoners in California that are reported to have some kind of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 See People v. Olguin, 31 Cal. App. 1355, 1371 (1994).	  	  
125 § 186.22(f) (emphasis added).  
126 See Id.  
127 See People v. Gardeley, 927 P.2d 713, 721 (Cal. 1996). 
128 People v. Valdez, 58 Cal. App. 494 (1997).  
129 See 927 P.2d at 721. 
130 Id.  
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gang affiliation.131 It’s concerning to think that perhaps the high numbers of incarceration relate 
to the admission of otherwise inadmissible information if analyzed under the traditional expert 
analysis.132 
B. Why California’s Law is Too Expansive 
  The STEP Act and its progeny have a direct impact on California courts’ determinations 
on the permissibility and scope of gang expert testimony. The Act allows experts to characterize 
gangs as “criminal,” allows evidence of gang activity be based on three broad categories without 
further analysis, and allows experts to testify about heinous crimes, which the defendant may not 
have committed, or even been involved with.  
 First, during trial, any gang is considered a "criminal street gang" because of the STEP 
Act’s statutory definition.133 Thus, if the state alleges gang affiliation, then the jury will hear the 
judge, attorneys, and expert witnesses refer to the gang as “criminal” before the jury goes into 
the deliberation room. The prosecution has an advantage here because the gang expert, who is 
typically used to identify a gang or its members, will be asked to render an opinion about 
whether the defendant is part of a “criminal street gang.” This characterization triggers both rules 
403 and 404 because the label is extremely prejudicial to the defendant and supports the 
inference that because the gang that the defendant is affiliated with is “criminal,” than the 
defendant is “criminal” as well.134   
 Second, California courts are left with determining what testimony falls under the 
“culture, habits, and psychology” classifications.135 The confusion turned into a presumption that 
if gang activity is alleged, gang testimony is permissible so long as that testimony somehow fits 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 See supra note 116.  
132 See FED. R. EVID. 403.   
133 See § 186.  
134 See FED. R. EVID. 403, 404.  
135 See e.g., People v. Killebrew, 103 Cal. App. 644 (2002).  
 	   20	  
at least one of those three criteria.136 The more important analyses, such as relevance, reliability, 
and the risk of undue prejudice, are lost because California’s lower courts are focused on 
addressing whether the gang expert’s testimony falls under one of the three categories.   
 The deviation from traditional evidence rules is shown in the opinion, People v. 
Killebrew.137 The California Court of Appeals listed thirty different cases that considered eight 
factors found to be permissible under the “culture, habits, and psychology” requirement.138 The 
court determined that since none of those cases considered the subject of the expert’s testimony 
in its case (determining intent), the testimony was improper and fell outside of the “culture, 
habits, and psychology” realm.139 On that basis, the court held that the lower court’s decision to 
permit the expert was clear error.140  
 Killebrew did not question the reliability of the expert’s analysis nor did the court balance 
the risk of prejudice to the evidence’s probative nature. This fact is particularly disturbing 
because both the reliability and undue prejudice analyses were established to protect the rights of 
the accused. By way of those factors, California has ultimately opened the gates for its courts to 
admit improper gang expert testimony so long as the evidence, even nominally, falls under one 
of the three extremely broad classifications.  
 The danger that a jury will make an improper inference when gang a gang relationship is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 See Id. For an argument regarding the repercussions of the Gardeley decision, see Patrick Mark 
Mahoney, Note, Houses Built on Sand: Police Expert Testimony in California Gang Prosecutions: Did 
Gardeley Go Too Far?, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 385 (2004).  
137 Killebrew, 103 Cal. App. at 657.	  
138 Id. (The cases that cite Gardeley repeatedly refer to expert testimony about the “culture and habits” of 
criminal street gangs in eight ways . . . size, composition or existence of a gang . . . gang turf or territory . 
. . an individual defendant's membership in, or association with, a gang . . . the primary activities of a 
specific gang . . . motivation for a particular crime, generally retaliation or intimidation . . . how a crime 
was committed to benefit or promote a gang . . . rivalries between gangs . . . gang-related tattoos, gang 
graffiti and hand signs . . . colors or attire) (citations omitted).  
139 Id. at 658.  
140 Id.  
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alleged is substantial, and accordingly, trial courts must ensure that the jury does not consider 
unreliable information, nor may the jury have the impression that gang membership alone 
equates to guilt. Although a jurisdiction’s rules of evidence and a defendant’s right to appeal 
exist to protect the rights of the accused,141 they do not protect against complete disregard of 
traditional rules, especially when the higher court supports the departure. Even so, the likelihood 
that a higher court will reverse such a discretionary decision is minimal at best.142  
 Finally, the California Supreme Court’s Gardeley decision held that the “pattern of gang 
activity” prong may be shown “by introducing evidence of one or more of the crimes enumerated 
in the statute that were committed by any of the gang’s members, not necessarily by the 
defendant, even if the defendant did not know the perpetrators, as many gangs tend to be quite 
large.”143  
 The court’s holding explicitly violates the rule against character evidence.144 By allowing 
a gang expert to testify about the gang’s prior criminal acts in general, the court actually supports 
a party’s offering evidence for an impermissible purpose. The state can prove an element by 
showing that the defendant is a part of a group that commits crimes, and because of that fact, he 
acted in accordance with the gang, and committed a crime, too.  Also, the expert is likely to 
testify about former crimes that are quite violent.145 One attorney noted that a “gang expert will 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 See Green v. Block Laundry Mach. Co, 490 U.S. 504, 529 (1981) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Note, 
Procedural Protections of the Criminal Defendant: A Reevaluation of the Privilege Against Self-
incrimination and the Rule Excluding Evidence of Propensity to Commit Crime, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 426, 
440, 450 (1964)).  
142 See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Limited Path Dependency of Precedent, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 903, 987-
988 (2005).	  	  
143 See note 125; see also Gregory A. Dohi and Darrell Mavis, Getting a Good Grasp on Gang Cases 
(April 16, 2014) available at https://www.dailyjournal.com/cle.cfm?show=CLEDisplayArticle&q 
VersionID=338&eid=913976&evid=1&qtypeid=8 
144 See FED. R. EVID. 404.  
145 See Erin R. Yoshino, California’s Criminal Gang Enhancements: Lessons From Interviews with 
Practitioners, 18 USC Rev. of L. & Soc. Just. 117, 135 (2008). 
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often choose the most heinous and violent crimes to illustrate the gang’s pattern of criminal 
activity.”146 Thus, the testimony further prejudices the defendant not only by introducing crimes 
not necessarily committed by him or her, but by allowing the expert to testify about crimes that 
likely shock the conscience and substantially prejudice the defendant. 
 The state does allow gang enhancements to be bifurcated from the original charge and 
considered at a separate jury trial.147 However, when a deputy public defender in California was 
asked how often a gang enhancement is bifurcated, he replied, ‘“[a]bout as often as the Clippers 
win the Championship,’ which means almost never.”148 He ‘“believed that gang enhancements 
are rarely bifurcated because of the prosecutorial advantages of a gang enhancement and because 
of judges’ concerns for judicial efficiency.”’149 The defendant must then defend against the crime 
charged and against crimes committed by the gang that he or she allegedly belongs, which is 
inherently unfair, especially when the topic is so inflammatory.  
IV. GANG EXPERT TESTIMONY IS MORE APPROPRIATE IN CASES WHERE CHARGES INCLUDE AN 
ELEMENT OF GANG AFFILIATION SO LONG AS NO OTHER LESS PREJUDICIAL EVIDENCE EXISTS 
 
 A number of states have passed laws to combat gang activity, similar to California. In 
those states, a statute’s language may incorporate the element of gang membership. 150 
Consequently, prosecutors are placed in a position where they must prove gang ties beyond a 
reasonable doubt. For that reason, the state must introduce evidence of a gang relationship or 
there is no basis for a conviction. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 See Id.  
147 See § 186.22 
148 See supra note 143.  
149 See Id.; see also People v. Hernandez, 94 P.3d 1080 (2004) (holding that the lower court did not abuse 
discretion when it did not bifurcate gang enhancement from other charges).   
150 Georgia has the “Georgia Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act of 1992”, GA. CODE. ANN. § 16-
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 There is a significant difference between a case in which gang activity is part of the 
crime151 and a case where gang activity is used to prove a crime.152 In the former, the prosecution 
must establish that gang activity actually exists.153 In the latter, on the other hand, evidence of 
gang ties need not be admitted for the state to prevail.154 Accordingly, a gang expert’s testimony 
is much more relevant to cases where gang activity is part of the charge. This is especially true if 
the defendant denies that he or she is part of a gang.  
 Yet, courts are still required to balance the risk of unfair prejudice versus the probative 
value of the evidence.155 When this analysis is under way, courts should consider the gang expert 
testimony in light of the other evidence available. The court should be more inclined to exclude 
the testimony when the prosecution can prove this element with alternate forms of evidence.  
Although gang expert testimony may be more relevant in cases where gang affiliation is an 
essential element of the crime, the probative value of the testimony is reduced if the state can 
prove the element through other, less prejudicial, means. In that sense, the use of a gang expert in 
this context is still quite narrow.  
 For example, if the state cannot sufficiently prove gang ties without an expert that tends 
to prove an affiliation, then the use of a gang expert may be proper. However, if the prosecution 
can sufficiently prove the element by introducing other evidence such as eyewitness testimony, 
then the probative value of the gang expert’s testimony lowers to only nominal probative value. 
Additionally, when a gang expert takes the stand, there is a significant likelihood that certain 	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characteristics of a gang–such as illegal tendencies or violent characteristics–will be exposed.156 
If a court finds that less prejudicial evidence is sufficient, then the court is also fulfilling its duty 
to avoid improper character inferences by the jury. 
 This theory has been adopted in a number of states. For example, in State v. Deshay, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court explained, “[just because] criminal gang involvement is an element of 
the crime does not open the door to unlimited expert testimony.”157 Deshay involved a defendant 
who was charged with committing a drug crime for the benefit of a gang.158 The defendant 
argued that he was not a member of the alleged gang, thus putting the state in a position where it 
had to prove that element through other evidence.159 The state offered not only gang expert 
testimony by a police officer, but also witness testimony by three lay witnesses who testified that 
the defendant was, in fact, a part of the gang.160 The jury convicted the defendant.161 On appeal, 
the Court reversed the verdict because the expert testimony was unduly prejudicial.162 The court 
alluded that the eyewitness testimony was enough to sufficiently prove the element of a gang 
relationship.163 The court reasoned that, “[i]n this noncomplex drug conspiracy case, much of the 
gang expert's testimony was duplicative and of little real assistance to the jury . . . .”164  
 This kind of analysis is not brand new. In fact, there are other instances in which a court 
has denied certain prejudicial evidence in favor of less prejudicial evidence that serves to prove 
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the same fact, such as proof of convict status.165 Consider the United States Supreme Court 
decision in Old Chief v. United States.166 The state had to prove that the defendant was a felon to 
show that he was guilty of felony in possession of a firearm.167 The lower court allowed the 
prosecution to introduce the order of judgment for Old Chief’s prior conviction, which showed 
that his former conviction was substantially similar to the charges he was facing.168 Old Chief 
objected to the admission of the evidence on grounds that it was unduly prejudicial.169 He offered 
to stipulate that he had been convicted of a felony without mention of what the former conviction 
was for, ultimately conceding for the prosecution that element of the crime.170 
 The Supreme Court held that the admission of the order of judgment was an abuse of 
discretion because it was unduly prejudicial to Old Chief.171 The Court stated that in “weighing . 
. . the probative against the prejudicial, the functions of competing evidence are distinguishable 
only by the risk inherent in the one and wholly absent from the other.”172 The Court further 
reasoned that the probative value of the order was significantly reduced when other, less 
prejudicial evidence was available.173 Because the probative value was reduced, the risk of 
prejudice was too high against Old Chief.174  
 The Old Chief rationale should be applied to gang expert testimony when gang affiliation 
is an essential element of the crime. Even the assertion of a gang relationship is incredibly 
inflaming to the defendant. When the state offers an expert at trial, the prosecution will likely 
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elicit information from that witness that goes beyond the question of whether the defendant is 
involved in a gang because the state must lay a foundation and rationale for the expert’s 
opinion.175 Consequently, the jury will likely learn about the gang’s activities, including those 
that are illegal or violent. Also, the prior activities may in fact be similar to what the defendant is 
on trial for, substantially prejudicing the defendant. If a defendant is willing to stipulate or an 
eyewitness can testify that he or she is part of a gang, then the expert testimony becomes much 
less probative to the case. Similar to the rationale in Old Chief, if the prosecution can prove the 
element through less prejudicial means, here, being a stipulation or eyewitness testimony, then, 
when comparing those types of evidence to gang expert testimony, the risk of undue prejudice in 
the expert testimony substantially outweighs the inherent risk in the former.  
 There is always the argument that the prosecution is entitled to prove its case “as it sees 
fit” and that the state “has a right to paint a colorful story with descriptive richness.”176 In fact, 
the dissent in Old Chief asserts that this right is a “fundamental principle in criminal 
prosecution.”177 However, the main purpose elicited is to protect from a jury’s want for more 
information.178 The Court goes on to explain that, “as its pieces come together a narrative gains 
momentum, with power not only to support conclusions but to sustain the willingness of jurors to 
draw the inferences, whatever they may be, necessary to reach an honest verdict.”179 
 In the case where gang affiliation is an essential element, there is no risk that a “gap” in 
the evidentiary story occurs. The other, less prejudicial evidence is still telling the same 
narrative–that the defendant is a member of a particular gang–without the risk that the expert will 
mention certain prejudicial and non-relevant information. Although a narrative may aid the jury 	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in making fair inferences about guilt or innocence, the inferences elicited through a gang expert 
violate the rule against character evidence. If a gang expert is allowed to testify about a gang’s 
culture that includes illegal activities, then the juror will likely infer that the defendant is a bad 
person because he is equated with a group that commits crimes.  
 By stipulating to gang affiliation or by telling the story through an eyewitness, the jury is 
not “missing a piece of the puzzle” so to speak because the only fact that needs to be proven is 
the defendant’s membership in a gang. The activities of a gang are not at issue so that story is not 
one that the prosecution has a right to tell. Thus, there is little danger that the prosecution will be 
prohibited from being able to “tell a continuous story” because the story, in this case, is improper 
and highly inflammatory to the defendant. 180   
V. IN CASES WHERE GANG AFFILIATION IS NOT AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE CRIME, COURTS 
SHOULD ONLY ALLOW EXPERT TESTIMONY WHERE OTHER FACTS CORROBORATE THE EXPERT’S 
TESTIMONY 
 
 When a Court considers the admissibility of gang expert testimony in a case where gang 
affiliation is not an essential element of the crime, it should follow other jurisprudence that only 
allows the testimony if the opinion rendered is corroborated by other evidence. For example, if a 
co-conspirator implicates a defendant in a conspiracy, other evidence must corroborate those 
statements.181 This rule is also established in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 801(d)(2), which 
states that a co-conspirator’s “statement must be considered but does not by itself establish the 
declarant’s authority.”182 The “justification for this rule is that a co-conspirator's statement is 
considered rather unreliable.183 In Bourjaily v. United States, the Court stated, “[a] piece of 
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evidence, unreliable in isolation, may become quite probative when corroborated by other 
evidence.”184  
 The justification for the corroboration rule in conspiracy cases gives support that 
corroboration should be required where gang expert testimony is offered for a non-propensity 
reason. As explained earlier, one of the stronger arguments against admitting gang expert 
testimony is the issue of reliability.185  
 For most cases where a gang expert is introduced, the expert is a police officer 
specialized in gang-related activities.186 As already discussed in section II, the trouble with this 
type of expert is that the police officer’s duty is to identify and eliminate illegal gang activity. 
For that reason, this expert has more of an incentive to testify in a way that is prejudicial to the 
defendant so as to further the officer’s goals of minimizing potential gang activity.  
 Furthermore, gang experts typically rely on a number of factors to identify a gang and its 
members.187 These factors can either be too narrow or too broad in a sense that those factors are 
not generally accepted by the law enforcement community or they are accepted by many 
departments but do not consider the unique characteristics of each gang.188 Even beyond the 
experiences of a gang expert, the factors that a witness uses to make an identification raise 
reliability concerns.189 The factors are typically constructed by gang members or by law 
enforcement officials190 who have been considered “highly suspect” sources since their agendas 
may substantially depart from identifying true characteristics of a particular gang. 191  By 
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introducing evidence that supports what a “suspect” witness says, the state is ensuring that the 
testimony can be verified. 
 Both the Second and Eighth Circuits have recognized this theory in gang cases.192 In 
United States v. Frank, the Eighth Circuit held that a gang expert’s testimony pertaining to the El 
Forasteros motorcycle gang was admissible based on this very premise.193 This was the court that 
also rendered the opinion for United States v. Street, which reversed the jury’s guilty verdict 
because the gang expert’s testimony regarding the El Forasteros gang was unduly prejudicial and 
did nothing to tie the defendant to the group.194 In Frank, the court distinguished the two cases 
by explaining that, in Street, there was no evidence corroborating that the defendant was a part of 
the gang. In Frank, on the other hand, other evidence supported the expert’s testimony that the El 
Forasteros gang retaliated against “snitches.”195 Specifically, the expert’s opinion was bolstered 
by evidence showing that Frank was a former member of the motorcycle gang.196 Also, lay 
witness testimony indicated that Frank had adopted the gang’s view of snitches.197 The court 
concluded that the corroborating evidence made the expert’s testimony much more relevant and 
less prejudicial than if the testimony was offered on its own.198  
 There is always the argument that a court’s requirement of additional or corroborating 
evidence is a waste of time and exhausts judicial resources.199 Furthermore, the credibility of a 
witness is a matter for the jury–the finder of fact should decide whether to believe what an expert 	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says.200 However, the defendant has a constitutional right to a fair trial.201  The court has an 
obligation to bar overly prejudicial information202 and, in the case of a gang expert, the court 
should expect that the testimony will be extremely prejudicial, especially where a violent act is at 
issue. The additional requirement of corroborating an expert’s evidence is not new, as seen with 
conspiracy cases.  
 The information boosts the reliability of the expert’s testimony and at the same time 
protects the defendant against undue prejudice by ensuring that what the expert says has some 
credence. Also, by providing that the state bring more evidence to corroborate a gang expert’s 
testimony, the courts are ultimately giving the prosecution a better opportunity to tell a 
“colorful” story to the jury–something even the Supreme Court has found to be quite 
fundamental.203  
VI. IF THE TESTIMONY IS DETERMINED ADMISSIBLE THEN COURTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT THE 
SCOPE OF THE TESTIMONY IS SUFFICIENTLY NARROW AND IS FOLLOWED BY A JURY INSTRUCTION 
 
 Assuming that the Court went through the traditional expert analysis and determined that 
the expert is qualified to testify and that there is other evidence that could corroborate what the 
expert is going to say, the court needs to determine the scope of the testimony and rule out any 
information that goes beyond what the expert may discuss or what the jury is allowed to know.204  
 Courts are required to ensure that the expert only testify about information that he or she 
is qualified to discuss.205 Certainly, “a person may be qualified as an expert on one subject and 
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yet be unqualified to render an opinion on matters beyond the scope of that subject.”206 Beyond 
the qualification standard, courts must also ensure that experts only give light to issues that are 
contested between the two parties.207 The jury has no need for an expert to testify as to factual 
issues that the jury need not resolve, which gets support from the relevance and waste of time 
considerations.208 However, in many gang cases, the expert discusses much more than what the 
issue requires.209   
 In the interest of the defendant’s rights, courts should generally presume that broad 
testimony about gangs is impermissible. Many gangs have unique characteristics and a general 
overview of gangs causes the jury to assume that all gangs are the same, which is certainly not 
the case. Also, the witness should only relay information that proves a fact in issue, and in most 
cases, a general overview of a gang is not going to prove any specific fact. The facts of State v. 
Hinton show why.210  
 The defendant was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill.211 The 
court allowed a police officer to testify about gang activity in the city where the shooting took 
place.212 The victim testified that he stopped at a gas station about twenty minutes before he was 
shot.213 At the gas station, law enforcement officials found a bullet similar to the one used in the 
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shooting and they also recovered a red bandana laying on the ground in front of a gas pump.214 
The actual shooting took place at a different location.215  
 The expert was introduced to prove an aggravating factor–that gang activity was likely 
involved.216 When the officer testified, he used words such as “gang,” “gangster,” “Bloods,” and 
“Crips” over “ninety-one times.” 217  The officer testified that Bloods and Crips are the 
predominant gangs in that city and discussed the different conflicts between the gangs and intra-
gang violence.218 No other evidence was presented to show that the shooting was gang related 
other than testimony that the bandana was the same color as the “bloods”, an item found in a 
wholly different location than where the actual shooting took place.219 In fact, the state presented 
no evidence that the defendant was even a part of a particular gang.  
 On appeal, the court held that the gang-related testimony was “never ‘connected to the 
crime charged’ and was thus ‘“irrelevant and inadmissible.”’220 Although caught by the appeals 
court, the lack of limits on the gang expert’s testimony shows just how important safeguards to 
narrow expert testimony are. Although there may be strong public encouragement against gang 
activity, it does not mean that all avenues, especially judicial avenues, should be used against a 
potential member of a gang. As Hinton shows, safeguards as simple as a general narrowing of 
the information proffered is highly important.221 The rule reduces the likelihood of appeal on 
grounds of abuse of discretion, reducing the risk of wasting judicial resources. The Ninth Circuit 
has discussed such procedures.  
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 In United States v. Hudson, an officer’s expert testimony was held relevant where the 
lower court took “precautions” to limit the scope of the testimony and gave a limiting instruction 
that emphasized that the jury could not convict the defendant solely on account of his gang 
affiliation.222 The issue in the case was whether the defendant, a former felon, was in possession 
of a firearm.223 The defendant was discovered in a van with three other members all wearing the 
same outfit, shortly after a shooting spree took place down the street.224 The defendant was not 
discovered with a gun when he was arrested– one of the other members was.225 However, the 
gun only had the defendant’s fingerprints on it.226  
 The police officer that testified in the case was admitted as a gang expert related to the 
specific gang in question.227 He explained why the three men who ended up in the van together 
wearing common clothing “weren't there accidentally.”228 Hudson was wearing a local gang’s 
colors on the night he was arrested and the expert explained that the custom of that particular 
gang was that, when they wear their colors, they are getting ready for some type of gang-related 
activity.229 Also, the officer testified that this gang has a “loyalty” agreement and that it makes 
sense that the gun was passed to another member of the gang before the police could check the 
defendant.230  
 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the “testimony thus 
‘applied directly to [the defendant's] motive and preparation’ for the charged offense and did not 
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pertain to ‘any specific, wrongful acts . . . that [were] unrelated to’ that offense.”231 The court 
went on to applaud the district court’s assessment of the danger of unfair prejudice posed by the 
officer’s testimony.232 The court expressed that, by limiting the scope of the testimony, the risk 
of prejudice was reduced.233  
 The other aspect of Hudson that should be applied in all cases where a gang expert 
testifies is the appropriateness of a limiting jury instruction.234 A limiting instruction is one 
where “the judge must intervene and attempt to remove [the] prejudicial evidence procedurally, 
often by issuing an instruction to disregard it.”235 Every jurisdiction recognizes this safeguard.236 
The limiting instruction ensures that the jury knows what the purpose of the testimony is and also 
informs the jury not to use the information for any other purpose such as impermissible character 
inferences against the defendant. The safeguard is a simple one and should be used in all gang 
cases. 
 Hudson’s analysis of the admissibility and scope of the gang expert should be the general 
framework that all courts consider when a party offers this type of testimony. The court rightly 
limited the testimony to only discuss why it was relevant that the gun may have been passed off 
to another member of the car.237 Furthermore, the Court went beyond narrowing the scope of the 
testimony and also administered a limiting instruction to reduce the danger that the jury might 
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make improper inferences.238 These precautions are also in no way imposing on the court’s 
resources, as they are traditional ways to further protect the defendant.239 If all courts followed 
Hudson’s tough, yet traditional, scrutiny of the admission of gang experts, then courts would 
likely have more analogous outcomes in gang-related cases.  
VII. BACK TO THE BEGINNING: APPLYING THE PROPER ANALYSIS TO BYNUM AND KILLEBREW  
 
 To best show how the methodology discussed in this paper works, the Bynum case 
discussed in the Introduction and the Killebrew case discussed in Section III will be analyzed. 240 
 In Bynum, the state offered the testimony of a local police officer regarding the 
Boardman Boyz gang during trial in order to prove that the defendant committed premeditated 
murder.241 The charges against the defendant do not include gang membership as an essential 
element,242 so the state should offer other evidence that corroborates what the expert says on the 
stand.  
 Before the officer may offer an opinion, the court must consider whether the officer is 
qualified to testify. Once again, this analysis follows FRE 702 discussed in Section II. The 
officer was an active member of the investigation and a member of the local police 
department.243 He is a member of the department’s gang suppression unit and familiar with the 
alleged gang based on his experiences and observations as an officer.244 Although there is no 
information regarding the amount of time that the officer has spent in the unit, he is likely 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
238 Id.  
239 Cf. supra note 197.  
240 People v. Bynum, No. 307028, 2013 WL 1689660, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013), perm. app. granted,  
838 N.W.2d 884 (Mich. 2014). 
241 Id. at *6-7.  
242 Id. at *1.  
243 Id. at *2.  
244 Id.  
 	   36	  
qualified as an expert based on his own experiences with the gang, which is admissible under 
FRE 702.  
 The next consideration is whether the testimony is helpful and relevant to the case. This 
means that the testimony must aid the jury and “tend” to prove a fact at issue.245 In this case, the 
state offered the expert to show why the defendant acted the way he did.246 In other words, that 
the defendant was a member of a gang that had a rivalry with the victim’s gang and that the 
defendant was defending his turf. The jury is likely not familiar with the customs of the gang, so 
the testimony would help the jury understand more in-depth what the gang does and how 
membership may have influenced the defendant’s actions. The state’s purpose of showing 
motive, although not an essential element of the crime, is always admissible and does not violate 
other rules, such as rule 404 against character evidence. 
 Next, the testimony must be reliable. As explained in sections II and V, gang expert 
testimony tends to be unreliable and, similar to conspiracy cases, the court should only admit the 
testimony if it can be corroborated with other evidence. The expert explained that he used former 
police reports and interviews from the defendant’s neighbors to conclude that the defendant was 
a member of the gang.247 However, the state did not introduce witnesses such as neighbors to 
testify that the defendant is, in fact, a member of the gang. The officer did testify that the 
defendant has a gang name and pictures of the defendant’s name on his hand corroborated the 
officer’s testimony.248 Also, the expert testified that the convenience store where the murder 
occurred is in the defendant’s gang’s territory.249 Another witness testified that the convenience 
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store was the gang’s turf.250 This information may be sufficient to show that the police officer’s 
testimony is reliable.  
 Assuming that the testimony has jumped through the first four gates, the court must then 
consider whether the testimony’s extremely prejudicial nature substantially outweighs it 
probative value. In gang cases, the testimony is always prejudicial to the defendant because 
gangs are automatically stigmatized as criminal, and improper inferences about the defendant’s 
bad character are high.   The expert relied on former police reports, and those reports are likely to 
prejudicial to the defendant to be relied upon at the trial. However, the state has offered a 
legitimate purpose–to show motive, so this case is the perfect example where the testimony 
should be limited by the court.  
 The expert should only testify as to how he knows that the defendant is a member based 
on the tattoo, where the defendant’s gang hangs out (showing that the defendant was on his own 
turf), and finally that the defendant has a rivalry with the victim’s gang without mention of 
previous violent acts by defendant’s gang. The limit allows the expert to explain why the 
defendant was where he was at the time of the murder, and why the defendant may have been 
more likely to shoot at the victim. What the testimony does not do is introduce evidence of 
neither general gang testimony nor the defendant’s “hardcore” membership in a violent gang, 
which is exactly what Michigan’s district court allowed. 
 Finally, the court should ensure that the jury receives a jury instruction after both parties 
proffer their proofs. This ensures that the jury knows not to make a decision based on an 
impermissible purpose and also reminds them what the purpose of the expert’s testimony was. 
The analysis ensured that the expert’s testimony was reliable and allowed the state to offer the 
expert to tell its story without impeding on the rights of the defendant.  	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 Next we consider People v. Killebrew.251 The charges against the defendant include the 
element of gang membership, so expert testimony should be excluded if other, less probative 
evidence is available. In that case, Bakersfield police were on alert for East Side Crip members 
after another gang successfully shot and killed two of the Crip’s members at a drive-by shooting 
earlier in the day.252 The police suspected that the Crips would attempt to retaliate later that 
night.253 Law enforcement observed three cars driving together, one car where police watched an 
individual shove a gun under the passenger’s seat, and ended up stopping all three vehicles.254 
Killebrew was not in any car.255 Instead, the police watched Killebrew observe the stop while he 
was standing on a street corner.256 The police ended up discovering another handgun hidden in a 
box behind a taco stand near where Killebrew was standing.257 Ten men were arrested as a result 
of law enforcement’s observations and “[o]f the ten men,” the officers “recognized only one 
passenger [as] an East Side Crip. [O]fficers concluded . . . everyone was a member of the East 
Side Crips because the cars carried young Black males, it appeared the cars were being driven 
together, and one passenger was an East Side Crip.” 258  
 Killebrew was one of the ten men arrested that night.259 The state alleged that Killebrew 
conspired with the occupants of the car to possess a handgun in furtherance of gang activity.260  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
251 103 Cal. App.at 644 
252 Id. at 648. 
253 Id.  
254 Id. 
255 Id.  
256 Id.  
257 Id.  
258 Id.  
259 Id.  
260 Id. at 643.  
 	   39	  
The state offered a police officer to testify as a gang expert about the East Side Crips and why 
the behavior that night shows the members’ intent to possess a firearm.261  
 Assuming that the expert is qualified to testify about the East Side Crips (there was no 
information regarding his qualifications), the court must then ask whether the testimony is 
relevant and reliable. The testimony is relevant because it tends to show why the group of men 
may have had the intent to possess firearms, which is probative in the case. However, the 
testimony would be held inadmissible because of the officer’s lack of reliability. The officer 
testified that the only reason why Killebrew was a suspected gang member was because of the 
color of his skin and because another individual, who was not even with Killebrew at the time, 
was identified as an East Side Crips member. No other evidence was introduced to place 
Killebrew in the gang and the officer did not explain why those two factors were significant in 
making the identification. The factors that the officer relied on to identify Killebrew as a gang 
member are too attenuated to identify Killebrew as a member. Also, the factors are not 
generalized or unique to this particular gang. Thus, the admissibility of the expert’s testimony 
would fail even before other factors are considered because the methods used to prove Killebrew 
a gang member are too unreliable. As demonstrated here, the analysis protects the defendant 
from extremely unreliable, and ultimately, prejudicial testimony that minimally ties the 
defendant to a gang.  
VIII. CONCLUSION 
  
 The Sixth Amendment’s requirement that all criminal defendants be afforded the right to 
a fair trial in front of an impartial jury is “a fundamental principle in our system of jurisprudence, 
intended to protect the individual who is charged with a crime.”262 Gang members are afforded 	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the same protections and “the general character of the defendant and his conduct in other 
transactions is irrelevant.”263 Gang members are automatically stigmatized as criminals and the 
improper inference that all gang members are bad is something the courts must confront.  
 Courts are required to undergo a traditional analysis to qualify an individual as an expert. 
Courts should not fall victim to unnecessary factors such as the general “culture, habits, and 
psychology” factors that were introduced in California’s lower courts. When conducting the 
general analysis in gang cases, it is necessary for the court to focus on the reliability of the 
expert’s testimony and also the risk of undue prejudice. Courts should inquire into the source of 
expert’s information and determine that if that information is generalized or unique to the gang 
in question.  
 Also, a court must scrutinize the probative value of the testimony. If the testimony is 
offered to prove an essential element of the crime, the court should consider available 
alternatives to prove the element. If there is other evidence, then the probative value of the 
testimony is significantly reduced and the court should follow the Old Chief approach and 
exclude the testimony if it is highly prejudicial, yet minimally probative.   
 If the gang-related testimony is not offered to prove an essential element of the crime, the 
court should consider the purpose for which the testimony is being offered and also determine 
whether other evidence corroborates the testimony. If the expert testimony is presented under a 
permissible purpose, yet no facts can corroborate the testimony, then the court should question 
the reliability of the expert’s information.  
 Finally, if the testimony is admissible and proves a fact at issue in the case, then the court 
should take measures to limit the scope of the expert’s testimony. There should be a presumption 
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the unique gang at issue and may misconstrue facts such as the gang being affiliated with 
activities when in fact it is not. Even when the testimony is narrowed, courts, in all gang-related 
cases, should use a limiting instruction to inform the jury to only use the testimony for its proper 
purpose. It is a common safeguard and does not run the risk of wasting judicial time and 
resources.  
 This traditional, yet critical, analysis ensures that highly prejudicial gang-expert 
testimony is used in the most fair and efficient manner. These guidelines preserve the rights of 
the defendant and at the same time promote judicial integrity.  
